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ABSTRACT
Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies are gaining unprecedented popu-
larity and understanding. Meanwhile, Ethereum is gaining a signif-
icant popularity in the blockchain community, mainly due to the
fact that it is designed in a way that enables developers to write
smart contract and decentralized applications (Dapps). This new
paradigm of applications opens the door to many possibilities and
opportunities. However, the security of Ethereum smart contracts
has not received much attention; several Ethereum smart contracts
malfunctioning have recently been reported. Unlike many previous
works that have applied static and dynamic analyses to find bugs
in smart contracts, we do not attempt to define and extract any fea-
tures; instead we focus on reducing the expert’s labor costs. We first
present a new in-depth analysis of potential attacks methodology
and then translate the bytecode of solidity into RGB color code. Af-
ter that, we transform them to a fixed-sized encoded image. Finally,
the encoded image is fed to convolutional neural network (CNN)
for automatic feature extraction and learning, detecting compiler
bugs of Ethereum smart contract.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→ Transfer learning; Supervised
learning by classification; • Applied computing→ Digital cash;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since Satoshi Nakamoto published the article "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-
Peer Electronic Cash System" in 2008 [1], and after the official
launch of Bitcoin in 2009, technologies such as blockchain and
cryptocurrency have attracted attentions from academia and indus-
try. At present, the technologies have been applied to many fields
such as medical science, economics, Internet of Things [2]. Since
the launch of Ethereum (Next Generation Encryption Platform) [3]
with Vital contract function proposed by Vitalik Buterin in 2015,
lots of attention has been obtained on its dedicated cryptocurrency
Ether, smart contract, blockchain and its decentralized Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM). The main reason is that its design method
provides developers with the ability to develop Decentralized apps
(Dapps), and thus obtain wider applications. A new application
paradigm opens the door to many possibilities and opportunities.
Smart contracts are stored in blocks in order to assist in the
negotiation and implementation of the verification contract. The
New York Times stated that it distributes and pays the use of public
computers that constitute the Internet by many users through the
use of Ethereum [4]; Bloomberg Businessweek claims that it is
a software that is shared to everyone and cannot be tampered
[5]. Smart contracts can interact with the database at a low cost,
resulting in a decentralized autonomous organization [6] made
up of Ethereum; at the same time, because it is transparent, the
smart contract can prove that its claimed function is real, eg. virtual
casinos can prove its fairness [7]. However, the security of smart
contracts has not received the same attention, and because of its
openness, if there are vulnerability in the contract, anyone can
immediately see it, but it cannot be stopped immediately. The DAO
vulnerabilities that worth more than $50 million US dollars is an
example [8, 9]. And it raises a similar error through static analysis.
There are many vulnerabilities in the Ethereum smart contract,
including "Call Stack Attack Vulnerability" [10], "Time Dependance
Vulnerability" [11] and various other known vulnerabilities [2].
These development defects caused thousands of dollars in losses.
Compared to traditional programming which can be patched if an
error is detected, the smart contract on the blockchain is irreversible
and immutable; regardless of its popularity or howmuch it is worth,
the vulnerability cannot be repaired. Hence it is important to further
determine the correctness of smart contracts before deployment.
At present, the most widely used security analysis technology
is static analysis. However, static analysis needs to be preceded by
expert manpower through the analysis of the source code and the
acquisition of key code execution sections as a feature to check
whether they may result in malicious trading behavior. The static
analysis method is less applicable because of the irreversible and
immutable nature of the development of smart contracts. Therefore,
we have developed a color representation for translating the byte-
code of solidity (Ethereum smart contract develop language) into
RGB color code and transform them to a fixed-sized encoded image.
After that, we also implement a Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) model to perform single-label classification of solidity byte-
code images (without extracting features from the solidity source
code manually in advance). The models we have tried (AlexNet,
GoogleNet, and Inception-v3) have achieved good results in our
experiments in addition to the good results achieved with the Ima-
geNet Large-Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC); how-
ever, the solidity compilation vulnerability usually does not happen
alone, so we further optimize it by using multi-label classification
of solidity bytecode images through Transfer Learning, which takes
only 1.5 seconds per analysis and obtains more accurate multi-label
classification results. Because of the inability of smart contracts to
be repaired after deployment, we hope that with the tools we have
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developed, we can provide developers with early detection of rele-
vant vulnerabilities to repair and reduce smart contracts without
deploying source code before deployment to reduce the security
issues.
2 RELATEDWORK
A very recent study conducted analysis on nearly one million con-
tracts; among them, 34,200 contracts are vulnerable and nearly 4,000
contracts are practically exploitable. Smart contracts can hardly be
adjusted once deployed. To achieve secure contracts, the key step
is to have a thorough security examination before deployment [12].
Loi Luu et al, considered that it is more accurate than the dynamic
analysis if the results of the path-by-path method are inferred by
static analysis, especially for Ethereum. The uncertainty and com-
plexity of the blockchain behavior makes it difficult to simulate the
execution environment. It is the biggest issue for dynamic analysis.
Therefore, they developed an execution tool for symbols, called
Oyente, to discover potential vulnerability in Ethereum’s smart
contracts[14].
Each symbolic path has a path condition which is a formula over
the symbolic inputs built by accumulating constraints which those
inputs must satisfy in order for execution to follow that path. A path
is infeasible if its path condition is unsatiable. Otherwise, the path is
feasible. Among 19366 existing Ethereum smart contracts, Oyente
flags 8833 of them as vulnerable, including the The DAO which
led to a $50 million US dollar loss in June 2016 [13]. IBM Research
presents a framework (ZEUS) to verify the correctness and validate
the fairness of smart contracts. ZEUS abstract interpretation and
symbolic model checking, along with the power of constrained horn
clauses to quickly verify contracts for safety [15]. At the same time,
they have analyzed almost 22.4K smart contractsïĳŇand discover
94.6% of contracts (containing cryptocurrency worth more than
$0.5 billion) are vulnerable. Microsoft Research, Inria, and Harvard
University also have developed a dependent types and monadic
effects framework F* (a functional programming language aimed
at program verification), and automated queries to statically verify
properties on EVM bytecode and Solidity sources [16].
In summary, currently, most of the Ethereum security research
still rely on labor-intensive examination and focus only on ana-
lyzing the control flow graph (CFG) or symbolic execution of the
smart contract. so as to determinewhether the program under test is
causing malicious transaction behavior. This is insufficient in identi-
fying the security flaws in codes. However, Machine Learning/Deep
Learning (ML/DL) already has a wide range of applications, espe-
cially in security problems, such as spam filtering, botnet detection,
and malware classification. Mean in while our proposed system
is designed particularly for the security examination of contracts
with the minimum labor cost.
3 OUR PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
We have developed a color representation for translating the byte-
code of solidity into RGB color code and transform them to a fixed-
sized encoded image. After that, the encoded image is fed to con-
volutional neural network for automatic feature extraction and
learning (without extracting features from the solidity source code
manually in advance.), reducing the expert’s labor costs. Such trans-
lation is also featured by the fact that more complex information in
the solidity source code can be preserved in the color image with
16777216 colors (each sampling with 24 bit pixels) compared to the
gray scale image with only 256 colors (each sampling with 8 bit
pixels). With the fully connected network infrastructure of DNN,
though it can deal with its large amount of parameters, however,
the local receptive fields and shared weights of CNN make it more
suited for more complex structure. It not only decreases the amount
of parameters, but also reflects the complexity of smart contract,
saving the time for huge computation with current method.
3.1 The Core Technology of Our Methodology
Figure 1: The bytecode of the smart contract example.
0xffd75cc3d9cf61b65533406724ae8cbab0b7483d 0xfd8971d5e8e1740ce2d0a84095fca4de729d0c16 0xFD1E3d3E641f224CE8e1117866CF3F01ed2D5D9f
0xfDAceC5A4158Bb578c0a079a7DC3516f319460b9
Benign
Bug
0xfbe2fa4d1eff72d1c0e7e06ec731f44a85fc76ec 0xf054d4bab1cd5726756cf5417565fd446255b279
Figure 2: The solidity2jpg of the smart contract example.
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We now explain further in details. Firstly, taking the smart con-
tract of TheDAO (0xBB9bc244D798123fDe783fCc1C72d3Bb8C189413)
as an example, its bytecode can be obtained in "https://etherscan.io"
(as shown in Fig. 1). After that, we perform translating the byte-
code of solidity into RGB color code (eg 606060 =(R:96, G:96, B:96),
405260 = (R:64, G:82, B:96), 00357c = ( R: 64, G: 81, B: 96)) and then
convert bytecode to rgb color code. After this, we can get color im-
ages. Then we input these images to CNN for training the compiler
bugs detection model for smart contracts. Fig. 2 is an example of
converting the bytecode of solidity to jpg.
According to our experience, we also found that two approaches
might be used to escape our smart contract detection:
• Since the traditional filter size of CNN is 3*3 or 5*5, the
uncorrelated bytecode might become correlated when we
transform smart contract into images. The compiler bugs
of smart contract may evade the detection by taking ad-
vantage of such a mismatch.
• Meanwhile, smart contract color images are not natural
images; instead, they are formed from solidity source code.
Thus, the pooling inevitably destroys the contexts and
semantics of the malware code, causing the detection inac-
curacy.
To address the above two issues, we did many experiments with
CNN models (includes AlexNet, GoogleNet, and Inception-v3). We
found the characteristics of 1x1 convolution in "Network in Net-
work " [17]. 1x1 convolution is equivalent to cross-channel para-
metric pooling layer, and this cascaded cross channel parametric
pooling structure allows complex and learnable interactions of cross
channel information.
3.2 The Architecture of Our Methodology
Fig. 3 is a screenshot of our internal proof-of-concept UI, and Fig. 4
is the result of the passback of our RESTful API (multi-label). A brief
description of our system flow chart is shown as follows (steps 1-4
are off-line phases for our internal development and steps 5-6 are
online phases, where the user can interact with the system. More
specifically, after uploading the bytecode and invokes our RESTful
API, the user can obtain the analysis result.):
• Step 1. Crawling the bytecode of smart contract from ether-
scan by pyspider (including benign and malicious ones) as
sample;
• Step 2. Transforming the bytecode of smart contract into
RGB color code and transforming them to a fixed-sized
encoded image;
• Step 3. After that, the encoded image is fed to convolutional
neural network for automatic feature extraction and learn-
ing (without extracting features from the solidity source
code manually in advance.)
• Step 4. Finally, once the model has been trained and vali-
dated, we deploy it on the backend server.
• Step 5. Only provide the bytecode of smart contract, we
will transform it into smart contract color image.
• Step 6. After the bytecode of smart contract are all iden-
tified, the scanned results will be provided to the users
through our visualization tool and public RESTful API.
However, we also found more key problems. Because the gap
between the number of normal contract and the number of vulner-
able contract samples is very large, and currently there is only 17
Solidity known bugs such as "optimizerStateKnowledgeNotReset-
ForJumpdest", "ArrayAccessCleanHigherOrderBits", and " Ancient-
Compiler" etc., and their gap is also very large. We need to collect
those imbalanced data and we need sufficient training data in this
domain. It means that a picturewill be defined inmultiple categories.
Therefore, based on our previous research [18], we re-implement
Inception-v3 to multi-label classification through Transfer Learning.
For example, 0xbBCf10D6bc180172d8d352BE5bBCfB814E8f3474 is
at the same time with Solidity bugs including SolidFunSelectSe-
lector, DelegateCallReturnValue, ECRecoverMalformedInput and
SkipEmptyStringLiteral.
Figure 3: The screenshot of our proof of concept UI.
Figure 4: The screenshot of our RESTful API result .
3
Figure 5: The screenshot of our proof of concept scan result.
4 EXPERIMENT RESULT
We run it on a 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04, and hardware setting are 128
GB DDR4 2400 RAM and Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2620 v4 CPU, NVIDIA
TITANV, TITANXP andGTX 1080 GPUs; more specifically, the soft-
ware setting is the nvidia-docker tensorflow:18.04-py2 on NVIDIA
cloud. The research results and the data will be found on our website
http://R2D2.TWMAN.ORG.
We first crawled from the etherscan.io for the verified contract
information from Jan. 2018 to Apr. 2018. The smart contract message
on this website represents that the ethereum mainnet has been
verified. We further translate them into color images and feed them
to CNN for training.
• AlexNet
– 100 epoch, LR: 0.01, accuracy: 83.85%, loss: 0.34
– 250 epoch, LR: 0.01, accuracy: 86%, loss: 0.39
• GoogleNet
– 100 epoch, LR: 0.01, accuracy: 86%, loss: 0.32
– 250 epoch, LR: 0.01, accuracy: 90%, loss: 0.53
• Inception-v3
– 100 epoch, LR: 0.001, accuracy: 97.10%, loss: 0.1345
– 100 epoch, LR: 0.0001, accuracy: 96.52%, loss: 0.0935
– 500 epoch, LR: 0.001, accuracy: 97.39%, loss: 0.1876
– 500 epoch, LR: 0.0001, accuracy: 83.76%, loss: 1.08445
After that, we collected from May. 2018 to Jun 2018 from ether-
scan.io as our test dataset with Inception-v3. We calculate metrics
such as accuracy, precision and recall and show the results as fol-
lows.
• 100 epoch, LR 0.001, accuracy: 95.44%, precision: 95.42%,
recall: 98.5%
• 100 epoch, LR 0.0001, accuracy: 95.61%, precision: 95.26%,
recall: 98.9%
• 500 epoch, LR 0.001, accuracy: 95.85%, precision: 95.44%,
recall: 99.04%
• 500 epoch, LR 0.0001, accuracy: 83.65%, precision: 86.48%,
recall: 91.46%
On the other hand, since the solidity compile bugs of smart
contracts have the characteristics of multi-label, we initially identify
if there are compile bugs. If the analysis results are malicious, we
use transfer learning for multi-label. After training and inference,
the results obtained are shown in Figure 4. Fig. 5 is a screenshot of
our public proof-of-concept scan result.
5 CONCLUSION
According to our data, there are 1800 new smart contract produced
on ethereum main net per day. Amongst less than 30% is verified
by etherscan. Meanwhile according to the third party blockchain
evaluation system, Rating Token (https://ratingtoken.io) and coin-
schedule, in 2018, there has been 11.75 billion US dollars financed
by ICO projects. One of the key factors for the success of a smart
contract for each project is the existence of a loophole; Our goal
is to optimize the amount of parameters, network structure, and
release automated verification tools and public RESTful API. The
above experiment results demonstrate that our proposed system
can have accurate security analysis on contracts with very limited
labor cost.
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